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COMMENTS
TAXATION: DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY
ANOTHER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A SERVICE
TO A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") allows a taxpayer to deduct, as a charitable contribution, gifts to qualified organizations.! If a
taxpayer provides a service to such an organization, the taxpayer may
not deduct the value of the services. 2 He may, however, deduct unreimbursed expenditures incurred as a result of providing such services. 3
When taxpayers deduct payments for expenses resulting from services
provided by someone other than the taxpayer, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has consistently denied such deductions. Litigation of this
issue has led to disparate results. In virtually identical situations, the
United States Tax Court and the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho denied the deductions,4 while the United States Courts
1. I.R.C. § 170 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). Unless otherwise noted, all references
herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Section 170 provides in part:
(a) Allowance of deduction. (1) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c» payment of which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a
deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

••••
(c) Charitable contribution defined.-For purposes of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the
use of-

••••

(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-

••••

(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual. . . .
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1984).
3. Id. Section 1.170A-l(g) provides:
[U]nreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to
an organization contributions to which are deductible may constitute a
deductible contribution. For example, the cost of a uniform without general utility which is required to be worn in performing donated services is
deductible. Similarly. out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily
incurred in performing donated services are deductible. Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from
home in the course of performing donated services also are deductible.
4. See Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 932 (1984), aff'g 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734
(1983), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986); Davis v. United States, 664 F. Supp.
468 (D. Idaho 1987).
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of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits permitted them. S This article
examines the different approaches taken by the courts in these cases, the
tests applied as a result of the different approaches and the origin of the
different tests applied. Based on a recent Supreme Court decision 6 involving a charitable contribution of a different character, a new test is
proposed, and pertinent factors to be considered in its application are
discussed.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Statutory Provisions

Section 170 of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct contributions or
gifts to or for the use of an organization operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. 7 Generally,
no deductions are allowed for personal, living and family expenses, 8 or
for the value of services contributed to a charitable organization. 9 Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-l(g), however, does allow the deduction
of unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services
to a charity.lO Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from home as well as out-of-pocket transportation costs necessarily incurred in the course of performing donated
services are deductible. 1 1

B.

Court Decisions

In Brinley v. Commissioner 12 (Brinley I), the Tax Court held that
the taxpayers could not take as a charitable deduction payments made
for the expenses of their son who had been called by his church to serve
for a period of two years as a full-time, ordained and unsalaried missionary.13 The payments at issue in Brinley I were made by the taxpayers to
a church-designated travel agent for their son's travel to the site of missionary service. 14 Subsequent payments were made directly to their son
to support hini while he served as a missionary.Is The parents claimed
5. See Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986); White v. United States,
725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984).
6. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
7. I.R.C. § 170(a)(I), (c)(2)(B) (1982).
8. I.R.C. § 262 (1982). Section 262 provides, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family
expenses." [d.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1984).
10. [d.
11. [d.
12. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983), aff'd, 82 T.e. 932 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th
Cir. 1986).
13. [d. at 738.
14. [d. at 737.
15. [d. at 735, 737.
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the payments as a charitable deduction on their income tax return. 16 The
Commissioner of the IRS disallowed the deduction, and the Brinleys petitioned the Tax Court. The Tax Court held that the payments by the
taxpayers directly to the travel agency and to their son did not qualify for
a charitable deduction for two reasons. First, neither the travel agency
nor the son was a qualified recipient of charitable contributions under
section 170. 17 Second, the Tax Court utilized a "contributions analysis,"
examining whether the payments constituted a contribution by the parents to or for the use of the church}8 The court held that the payments
did nof constitute a contribution to the church because the church maintained no control over the funds ("control test").19
In White v. United States,20 a case factually indistinguishable from
Brinley 1,21 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
the payments to be deductible. 22 The court analyzed the payments as
unreimbursed expenditures incurred as a result of charitable service
("unreimbursed expenditure analysis").23 Although the government
urged the court to apply the Tax Court's control test, the Tenth Circuit
found that application of the control test is inappropriate where expenses
are incurred by a taxpayer performing services for a qualified organization.24 The court, criticizing the Tax Court's reasoning in Brinley I,
found no "rational basis for distinguishing the payment of the expenses
of a dependent son from the payment of the taxpayer's own expenses to
perform the same service."25 Applying the unreimbursed expenditure
analysis, the Tenth Circuit found the proper focus to be whether the donor's intent was charitable. 26 Specifically, the court found the proper test
to be "whether the primary purpose [of the taxpayer's donation] is to
further the aims of the charitable organization or to benefit the person
whose expenses are being paid. "27 The court determined that the transportation and living expenses of a missionary serving far from home primarily benefit the church and not the person making the payments
("primary benefit test").28 The payments would be deductible by the son
and, thus, were deductible by the parent.29
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

[d. at 735.
[d. at 737.
[d. at 737-38.
[d.
725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 1270.
[d. at 1272.
[d. at 1271.
[d.
[d. The court found that Code section 262, which disallows deductions for personal, living or family expenses, does not support such a distinction. [d.; I.R.C.
§ 262 (1982).
White, 725 F.2d at 1272.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1271-72.
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Subsequent to the Tenth Circuit decision in White, the Brinleys petitioned the Tax Court for reconsideration of its decision in Brinley I. After reconsideration of the issue, the Tax Court, in Brinley v.
CommissionerJO (Brinley II) reaffirmed its original decision. 31 The Tax
Court found that the facts in White and Brinley did not support an unreimbursed expenses analysis and, therefore, took exception to the Tenth
Circuit's application of a primary benefit test. 32 The Tax Court reasoned
that "the plain meaning of the language used in section 1.170A-I (g) of
the Income Tax Regulations, does not allow a taxpayer to deduct unreimbursed expenses incident to another family member's service to a
charity."33 The court stated that only the taxpayer who renders the service to the charity is allowed a charitable deduction for unreimbursed
expenses resulting from those services. 34 Thus, although the son might
be able to deduct his expenses, the parent cannot.
Applying the contributions analysis, the Tax Court held that the
taxpayer must intend that the payment benefit the church,3s and the taxpayer must demonstrate this intent by placing the funds under the control of the charity. 36 Because the church maintained no control over the
funds, the control test was not satisfied and the Tax Court disallowed the
deduction. 37
The Brinleys appealed the Tax Court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Brinley III).38 The Fifth Circuit addressed
the issue by utilizing both the unreimbursed expenditure analysis of the
Tenth Circuit and the contributions analysis of the Tax Court. 39 Contrary to the finding of the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit found nothing on
the face of section 1.170A-I(g) expressly limiting the deduction for expenditures incurred in the rendition of charitable service to the person
who actually performs the service. 40 For the payment of these expenses
to qualify as a deduction, the court held that the charitable work must be
the cause of the payment. 41 The court further held that the "charitable
work is the cause of an expenditure if the charity is the primary benefici30. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984), aff'g 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983),
vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
31. Id. Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court is bound only by prior decisions of the court of appeals to which a case would be appealed. Id. at 756-57. The
Brinleys' appeal was to the Fifth Circuit and, therefore, the Tax Court was not
bound by the Tenth Circuit decision in White. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 936.
32. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 937-38.
33.Id.
34. Id. at 938-39.
35. Id. at 941.
36. Id. at 940-41.
37. Id. at 941.
38. See Brinley V. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
39. See id. at 1332, 1334.
40. Id. at 1332.
41. Id. at 1331.
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ary."42 The court stated that application of the control test to prove the
donor's intent to benefit the charity was not required because the court
considered charitable intent to be irrelevant. 43
Under the unreimbursed expenditure analysis, expenditures for
proselytizing materials and out-of-pocket transportation expenses incurred in performing missionary work would be for the benefit of the
church and would, therefore, be deductible. 44 Because the son would be
spending an extended period of time in the place where he was performing missionary services, however, the court determined that the son was
not "away from home" within the meaning of section 1. 170A-1 (g). 4S
Therefore, under the unreimbursed expenditure analysis, the personal expenditures for the recreation, meals and lodging of the son would be primarily for the benefit of the individual missionary and, thus, would not
be deductible. 46
On the other hand, under the contributions analysis, the Fifth Circuit found that even if the payments primarily benefited the individual
missionary, the taxpayer would still be entitled to deduct the payments if
the church had control over the funds. 47 Discretion by the church as to
the use of the funds would constitute adequate contro1. 48
Donations that carry restrictions that they be used for the benefit of
some specified private individual are not deductible because the church
would have no discretion as to the use of the funds. 49 The court determined, however, that· control over the funds does not require actual or
physical possession of the donation by either the charitable organization
or an officer or agent of the organization. so Control is established when a
donation is made in response to the charity's solicitation for funds to
support a specific charitable purpose. 5 1 The court found that control
would be established s2 if the taxpayer can demonstrate a matching be42.Id.
43. Id. at 1332.
44.Id.
45. Id. at 1333-34. Section 1.170A-1(g) provides in part: "For the purposes of this
paragraph, the phrase 'while away from home' has the same meaning as that phrase
is used for purposes of section 162 and the regulations thereunder." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(g) (as amended in 1984).
46. Brinley III, 782 F.2d at 1332, 1334. Addressing the government's concern that a
liberal construction of the regulations would result in deductions for the same expense by both the person making the payment and the person performing the service, and a shifting of deductions from individuals in low-income tax brackets to
those in high-income tax brackets, the court responded by stating that such abuse
could be precluded by rigorous application of the primary benefit test. This test
requires that for the payment to be deductible under section 170, the taxpayer bears
the burden of proving that each payment to a third party primarily benefitted the
charitable organization. Id. at 1332.
47. Id. at 1334.
48.Id.
49.Id.
50. Id. at 1335.
51. Id.
52.Id.
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tween the charity's request that specific payments be made and the taxpayer's expenditures. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit would allow the
taxpayer to deduct payment for his son's meals and lodging if the taxpayer could demonstrate such a matching. 53 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the taxpayer's payments constitute a charitable deduction
if either the control test or the primary benefit test or a combination of
both tests is satisfied. 54
Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brinley III, the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho decided a similar case. In
Davis v. United States,55 the district court rejected both the Fifth and
Tenth Circuit decisions and followed the holding of the Tax Court. 56
The Davis court held that the primary benefit test is appropriate only
where the taxpayer seeks a charitable deduction for his own expenses and
therefore, unreimbursed expenses may be deducted only by the individual performing services away from home. 57
Thus, the Tax Court and the Davis court require that the control
test be satisfied under the contribution analysis. The Tenth Circuit rejects the control test of the contribution analysis and requires the primary benefit test to be satisfied under the unreimbursed expenditure
analysis. Finally, the Fifth Circuit examines"both approaches and allows
the deduction if either the control test or the primary benefit test or a
combination of the tests is satisfied. Therefore, the question remains as
to the appropriate test to be applied.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASES

The different tests applied and the different approaches taken by the
individual courts in Brinley I, Brinley III, Davis and White are the result
of those courts' differing resolutions of the following issues: (I) Whether
Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-I(g) permits a taxpayer other than
the person actually performing the service to claim a deduction, and
(2) whether a taxpayer must intend the payments to benefit the church. 58
53. Id. at 1334-35.
54. Id. at 1336.
55. 664 F. Supp. 468 (D. Idaho 1987). The United States District Court for the District
of Idaho lies in the Ninth Circuit.
56. Id. at 472-73.
57. Id. at 472.
58. Another distinction between the Tenth Circuit holding in White and the Fifth Circuit holding in Brinley III is whether the sons were "away from home" within the
meaning of Treasury Regulation section 1.l70A-l(g). Without discussing the applicable law, the Tenth Circuit summarily stated, "[T]ransportation and living expenses of a fulltime missionary serving far from home are deductible because ...
the expenditures primarily benefit the church and not the spender." White v.
United States, 725 F.2d at 1269, 1271 (lOth Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit applied
the appropriate statutory and case law to determine that the son's "tax home" for
purposes of section 170 was the site of his mission, and therefore the expenses were
not incurred while the son was "away from home." Brinley v. Commissioner, 782
F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Does Treasury Regulation Section 1. 1 70A-l (g) permit a taxpayer
other than the person actually performing the service to claim
a deduction?

The first difference between the Tax Court and the Davis court decisions and those of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, is the latters' determinations that Treasury Regulation section 1. 170A-l(g) allows someone other
than the person providing the service to claim the deduction. The Tax
Court in Brinley I & II and the Davis court held that only the person
providing the service may claim such a deduction. 59 The Tenth Circuit
in White found the regulation to be broad enough to allow a parent to
deduct the expenses of a dependent child,60 while the Fifth Circuit in
Brinley III found it broad enough to permit a taxpayer to deduct the
expenses of any other person performing the service. 61 The language of
the regulation neither expressly limits such a deduction to the person
providing the services nor expressly permits such a deduction by a person
other than the provider of the services. 62
Courts have permitted a taxpayer providing a service to a qualified
organization to deduct expenses of other persons who are also providing
a related service to the organization. 63 In Smith v. Commissioner,64 the
taxpayer, accompanied by his family, frequently traveled to Newfoundland for the purpose of disseminating the teachings of his church to small
groups of persons in the area. 65 The Tax Court permitted a deduction
for the taxpayer's travel, food and lodging expenses, as well as for similar
expenses attributable to his wife and older children. 66 The taxpayer's
wife usually cooked for the group of religious followers and took care of
the children, while the older children helped in the evangelistic work by
distributing literature. 67 The younger children did not contribute their
services to the charitable activities; therefore, a deduction for the expenses attributable to them was not allowed. 68
The result in Smith may be distinguished from that in Brinley II and
Davis on the basis that the expenses of Smith's wife and older children
were in fact Smith's expenses incurred in the performance of his service
to the church. If that were the case, however, the expenses attributable
to the younger children should also be deductible, because the expenses
were also for food and lodging incurred by the father while he was per59. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932, 938-39 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th
Cir. 1986); Davis v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Idaho 1987).
60. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
61. Brinley III, 782 F.2d at 1332.
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1984); see also supra note 3.
63. See McCollum v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (PH) 1808 (1978); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973).
64. 60 T.C. 988 (1973).
65. Id. at 990.
66. Id. at 991, 995.
67. Id. at 991.
68. Id. at 995.
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forming a service while away from home. The better distinction is that
the wife and older children were themselves performing a service to the
church. This distinction leads to an interpretation of Treasury Regulation section 1. 170A-1 (g) that permits a taxpayer to deduct the expenses
of another providing a service only if the taxpayer is also providing a
service to the charity. The broad language of the regulation, however,
does not support such a narrow interpretation. 69
Congress sought to encourage contributions to charitable organizations by providing for the deduction of such contributions from taxable
income. 7o Permitting a taxpayer to deduct the expenses of another who
provides the service to the charity furthers that legislative purpose. Frequently, persons with time to contribute services to charitable organizations, such as teenagers and retirees, have limited incomes and may not
be able to afford the additional expenses resulting from such charitable
work. On the. other hand, others who could afford such expenses may
not have the free time necessary to provide charitable services. Allowing
a person, who wishes to contribute funds to a charity to pay the expenses
of another person who volunteers his services to that charity encourages
both the charitable work and the contribution.
Furthermore, under the Tax Reform Act of 1986,71 Congress enacted Code section 170(k), which disallows any traveling expenses, including meals and lodging, while away from home if there is a significant
element of personal pleasure, recreation, or vacation in such travel. 72 Because section 170(k) was passed after the Fifth and Tenth Circuit decisions,73 Congress appears to have acquiesced to those decisions by not
restricting the deductions to only the provider of the services. 74
69.
70.
71.
72.

See supra note 3.
See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 142(d), 100 Stat. 2117, 2120.
I.R.C. § 170(k) (West Supp. 1988). Section 170(k) provides: "No deduction shall
be allowed under this section for traveling expenses (including amounts expended
for meals and lodging) while away from home, whether paid directly or by reimbursement, unless there i~ no significant element of personal pleasure, recreation, or
vacation in such travel." Id.
73. The Tenth Circuit decided White in January, 1984. The Fifth Circuit decided Brinley III in June, 1986. Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in October,
1986.
74. The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, prepared by the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, states in part:
[Section 170(k)] applies only with respect to expenses relating to travel by
a taxpayer or by a person associated with the taxpayer (e.g., a family member). The rule does not apply to the extent that the taxpayer pays for
travel by third parties who are participants in the charitable activity. For
example, this disallowance rule does not apply to travel expenditures personally incurred by a troop leader for a tax-exempt youth group who takes
children (unrelated to the taxpayer) belonging to the group on a camping
trip. . .. However, the disallowance rule applies in the case of any reciprocal arrangement (e.g., when two unrelated taxpayers pay each other's
travel expenses, or members of a group contribute to a fund that pays for
all of their travel expenses).
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Note that in the situation where A pays the expenses resulting from
B's service to a charitable organization, B may not take a deduction for
the expenses (whether or not A claims the deduction). Because those
expenses were paid by A, B has either been reimbursed for the expenses
or never incurred the expenses. Therefore, as to B, the expenses are not
"unreimbursed expenditures" within the meaning of Treasury Regulation section 1. 170A-I (g)Js
Where a taxpayer seeks to deduct the payment of expenses incurred
by another person as a result of charitable service, the IRS should require
the taxpayer to furnish certain information in his return to prevent
abuses and duplicate deductions. Such information might include the
social security number of the person providing the service and the relationship between that person and the taxpayer. Further, when the person providing the service is a dependent of the taxpayer, the calculation
of the amount of support required to classify that person as a dependent
under Code section 15276 should not include the expenses claimed as a
charitable deduction.

B.

Must a taxpayer intend the payments to benefit the church?

The Tax Court holds that to receive a charitable deduction a taxpayer must demonstrate that he intends a payment to benefit a charity.
According to the Tax Court, a taxpayer demonstrates such intent by
placing the funds under the control of the charity. 77 The Fifth Circuit,
on the other hand, finds charitable intent to be irrelevant. 78 These divergent conclusions are the result of the differing definitions that the respective courts assign to the term "gift" in section 170.
Some courts require that a taxpayer intend a contribution to benefit
the charity in order to be deductible under section 170. 79 The courts
have adopted the Supreme Court's definition in Commissioner v. Duberstein 80 of a "gift" that is excluded from gross income under section 102.81

75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

80.
81.

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 73 (Comm. Print 1987).
See supra note 3.
I.R.C. § 152 (1982).
Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932, 941 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir.
1986).
Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Orr v.
United States, 343 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965).
See, e.g., White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1984) (donor's
intent must be charitable); Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir.
1982) (where a contribution benefits the donor as well as the charity, the primary
purpose controls); Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977)
(critical issue revolves around donative intent); Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d
432,436 (7th Cir. 1964) (where donor intends to aid a friend in securing an education, payments to college are not deductible); Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932,
937 (1984) (the taxpayer must intend to contribute funds for the benefit of the
charity).
.
363 U.S. 278 (1960).
[d. at 285. The issue in Duberstein was whether the taxpayer would be permitted to
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Under this definition, a "contribution" or "gift" to or for the use of a
charity is a payment of cash or property without adequate consideration
and made from "detached and disinterested generosity."82 If the payment is the result of a moral or legal duty or is motivated by an anticipated economic benefit (other than its treatment as a tax deduction), it is
not a gift. 83 In Duberstein, the Supreme Court found the transferor's
donative intent to be the "most critical consideration. "84
Other courts have rejected the Duberstein definition for purposes of
charitable deductions, distinguishing the unfavored status of exclusions
under section 102 from the favored treatment given charitable contributions under section 170. 85 These courts refuse to find the SUbjective intent of the donor to be determinative and allow a deduction to the extent
the payment benefits the charity.86 When the taxpayer receives or expects to receive a substantial benefit, enough to provide a quid pro quo
from the transaction, however, the deduction is not allowed. 87 Thus, in
Singer Co. v. United States,88 the United States Court of Claims held that
discounts (bargain sales) given by the Singer Company to schools were
not deductible because the Singer Company expected a return in the nature of future increased sales when the students who had used the machines in the schools ultimately purchased machines of their own. 89
Discounts given by the company to other charities, however, were deductible because no future sales could be expected as a result of the use of
the machines by the other charities. 9O
A recent Supreme Court decision appears to have resolved the intent requirement for charitable deductions under section 170. In United
States v. American Bar Endowment,91 a case decided subsequent to Brinexclude from his taxable income the value of an automobile given to him by a business associate. Id. at 280-81. Code section 102(a) states, "Gross income does not
include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982).
82. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
83.Id.
84. Id. at 285-86.
85. See, e.g., Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986) (charitable
intent is an irrelevant consideration); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner,
380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967) (the court disagreed with
the emphasis upon a purely charitable intent); Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553,
557 (5th Cir. 1965) (the test is one of causation and the taxpayer's motivation is
irrelevant); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413,421 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (the court
avoided resting its decision on the "disinterested generosity" rules).
86. See Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131-35 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
87. Id. at 1132. "It is only when the donor receives or expects to receive additional
substantial benefits that courts are likely to conclude that a quid pro quo for the
transfer exists and that the donor is therefore not entitled to a charitable deduction." Id.
88. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
89. Id. at 424.
90.Id.
91. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
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ley III and White, the Supreme Court stated, "The sine qua non of a
charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum
demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of
the value of any benefit he received in return. "92
The payments in American Bar Endowment had a dual character of
purchase and contribution. 93 The taxpayers purchased life insurance at
group rates through American Bar Endowment (A.B.E.).94 As a precondition to the purchase of the insurance, the taxpayers were required to
relinquish their rights to any dividend at the end of the coverage period. 9s The relinquished dividends were retained by A.B.E. and used to
support its charitable activity.96 Thus, the payments benefited both the
taxpayer and the charity. If A.B.E. had returned the dividend to the
taxpayers and the taxpayers had then contributed the amount of the dividend to A.B.E., the contribution would have been deductible. 97 The
Supreme Court, however, determined that the dividends retained by
A.B.E. were not deductible. 98
The Court adopted a two-part test established by the IRS for payments which have the dual character of contribution and purchase. 99 If
the taxpayer knowingly pays a higher price for the purchase intending
the excess to benefit the charity, then the excess of the payment beyond
any benefit received by the taxpayer is deductible. loo The first prong of
the test provides that "the payment is deductible only if and to the extent
it exceeds the market value of the benefit received."lol To satisfy the first
prong, the taxpayer must show that he could have made a similar
purchase at a lower price. 102 The second prong requires that "the excess
payment must be 'made with the intention of making a gift.' "103 This is
achieved where the taxpayer demonstrates that he possessed knowledge
of the less expensive item at the time of the purchase but that he deliberately made the more expensive purchase in order to benefit the charitable
organization. 104
The courts that do not require donative intent for charitable gifts
distinguish between the favored status of charitable deductions under
section 170 and the unfavored status of exclusions from income under
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96.Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102.Id.
103.Id.
104. Id.

at
at
at
at

118 (emphasis supplied).
117-18.
108-09.
108.

at
at
at
at
at

120 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118-19.
118.
117-18.
117.

at 117-18.
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section 102. lOS No basis exists, however, for requiring intent for one type
of charitable gift and not for another. Therefore, if charitable intent is
required for gifts that are a combination of purchase and contribution
under American Bar Endowment, such intent should be required for expenses incurred in the performance of a service to a charitable organization. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's holding in Brinley III that the
taxpayer's charitable intent is not relevant lO6 is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's requirement of such intent in the second prong of the
American Bar Endowment test.107 To that extent, the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Brinley III must be overruled. lOS
To satisfy the intent requirement in American Bar Endowment, the
taxpayers were required to show not only that they could have purchased
less expensive coverage, but that they had actual knowledge of the less
expensive insurance at the time they made their payments to A.B.E.IOO
Therefore, where a taxpayer seeks to deduct payment of an expense incurred by another person in the performance of a service to a charitable
organization, the taxpayer must show that he knew he was making a
payment in excess of any benefit received by the performer of the service.
In other words, the taxpayer must show not only that he knew that the
service was being performed to benefit the charity, but also that he knew
that expenses were incurred as a result of the service and made the payment to cover those expenses.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See, e.g., Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1089-92 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986).
See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986).
In Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eight Circuit held
that American Bar Endowment applies only when the taxpayer receives a recognizable tangible benefit. Id. at 1328. The issue in Staples was not whether a third party
received a benefit from the payment, but whether the benefit received by the taxpayer was a recognizable tangible benefit. The taxpayer in Staples received religious
training in exchange for a payment to his church. Id. at 1325. The court held that
the training did not constitute a recognizable tangible benefit and, therefore, American Bar Endowment did not control. Id. at 1328. The Eighth Circuit stated that
the intent requirement of the second prong of the American Bar Endowment test
was an element to be considered in valuating the benefit to the taxpayer. Id. Because the court determined that there was no recognizable tangible benefit to the
taxpayer, the intent of the taxpayer was irrelevant.
Significantly, three other circuits have decided that payments similar to those
in Staples were not deductible because the taxpayers received a benefit equal to the
amount of the payments. See Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987);
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1994 (1988); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988). Although the courts did not reach the issue of
intent, the Fourth Circuit, in dicta, discussed the question of whether the "subjective intent or motive of the transferor, an objective assessme"nt of the difference in
value of the transferred property and any return benefits to the transferor or some
combination of the two" was required. Miller, 829 F.2d at 502 (finding that a resolution of this issue under the circumstances of the case was unnecessary).
109. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117-18.
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Modified American Bar Endowment Test

Development of the proper test to determine when a taxpayer may
deduct his payment of expenses incurred by another who performs a service for a charity begins with an examination of the different forms a gift
may take. Substantiated gifts of cash given directly to a qualified organization are rarely questioned by the IRS. Frequently, however, gifts will
be given either indirectly to an organization, such as through an agent of
the charity, or in a form other than cash, such as bargain sales or performance of a service. Many gifts provide a benefit not only to the charity but to the taxpayer or a third party as well. Payments to a person
who performs a service to a charitable organization are indirect and may
provide a benefit to both the charity and the persoa. providing the service.
The charitable organization receives the benefit of the service and the
person performing the service may receive payment for some of his personal expenses.
The payments in American Bar Endowment had the dual character
of providing a benefit to both the charity and the taxpayer.ll0 The charity received the dividend and the taxpayer received term life insurance
for the year. Because the payments in Brinley, III White,112 and Davis 113
provide a benefit to both the charity and the provider of services, they
may be analogized to the payments in American Bar Endowment. Therefore, the test adopted by the Supreme Court in American Bar Endowment 114 may be modified to provide a test for determining whether a
payment of an unreimbursed expense is deductible under section 170.
In order for a donation having the dual character of contribution
and purchase to constitute a deductible contribution under section 170,
the Supreme Court requires: "First, the payment is deductible only if and
to the extent it exceeds the market value of the benefit received [by the
taxpayer]. Second, the excess payment must be 'made with the intention
of making a gift.''' lIS In modifying this test for application to unreimbursed expenses made incident to the rendition of services to a charitable organization, it is necessary to apply each prong to the performance
of the service (i.e., the provider of the service), as well as to the expense
incurred in the performance of such service (i.e., the non-performing taxpayer). The first prong of the American Bar Endowment test would require that payment of expenses be deductible only to the extent it exceeds
any benefit received by either the performer of the service or the taxpayer. The provider of the service would benefit to the extent of payment
110. See id. at 116.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19 (Brinley I), 30-37 (Brinley II), 38-54
(Brinley III).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
115. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986) (citation
omitted).

1988]

Charitable Deductions

537

for any expenses not incurred incident to the service, Le. expenses which
would not be deductible by the provider of the service. The excess of any
benefit received by the provider of service would be those expenses incurred as a result of the service. Therefore, the payment is deductible
only to the extent that it would be deductible by the provider of service.
The second prong of the American Bar Endowment test would require
that both the taxpayer and the provider of service intend to benefit the
charity.
Thus, under a modified American Bar Endowment test a taxpayer
would be required to establish four elements: (1) the service performed
must provide a benefit to the charity in excess of any benefit to the taxpayer seeking the deduction; 116 (2) the performance of the service is intended to benefit the charity; 117 (3) the expense is incidental to the
performance of the charitable service;1l8 and (4) the payment of the expense is made with the intention of making a gift to the charity.1l9 This
modified American Bar Endowment test focuses both on the intent of the
person providing the service and on the intent of the person making the
payment and seeking the deduction.
The benefit to the charity of the performance of the service and the
charitable intent of the performer of the service is not an issue here and
for the purposes of this discussion will be presumed to have been established. Where a taxpayer seeks to deduct the expenses incurred by a
third person performing charitable work, the third and fourth requirements become pivotal.

D.

Applicability of the Primary Benefit and Control Tests

In determining whether an expense related to charitable service is
incidental to the performance of the service, courts generally have found
that "the charitable work must be the cause of the payment."120 The
payments must not be ones that the taxpayer would have made regardless of the charitable activity.121 The charitable activity causes the expense when the expenditure primarily benefits the charitable
organization rather than the taxpayer, hence the development of the primary benefit test.122
In analyzing the taxpayer's payment as a direct contribution to the
church, the Fifth Circuit, in Brinley II, found that even if the payments
primarily benefited the individual missionary, a taxpayer would be entitled to the deduction if he demonstrates a matching of the payments to
116. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
117. Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1982); Davis v. United
States, 664 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Idaho 1987).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
120. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Orr v.
United States, 343 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965».
121. Id.
122. Id.
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specific requests from the church. 123 This liberal control test is in conflict with the first requirement of the Supreme Court's test in American
Bar Endowment, which allowed the payment to be deductible only to the
extent of any excess beyond the benefits received by the taxpayer124 or, in
this case, by the person performing the service. While matching the payments to specific requests by the church might indicate that the taxpayer
intended that the payments benefit the church, such a matching does not
necessarily prove any benefit to the church beyond the church's desire
that such expenses be paid. An expense paid by a third party that is not
deductible by the person performing the service would be a benefit to the
performer and should not, at the option of the charitable organization,
become deductible to a third party.
The fourth prong of the modified American Bar Endowment test requires that the person paying the expenses intend such payment to benefit the charitable organization rather than the person performing the
services. To determine the intent of a person contributing to a qualified
organization, some courts have focused on the amount of control over
the funds retained by the donor or exercised by the charitable organization ("control test"). lis Although a donor may request that his contribution be applied to specific activities or funds of the organization,126 he
may not limit the organization's use of the contribution to benefit a designated individual. 127 Such a limitation would indicate that the donor intended the contribution to benefit the designated individual rather than
the charity.
The charitable intent of a person providing a service to a charity
may be evidenced by the nature of the charitable activity. The charitable
intent of a taxpayer serving as a full-time unsalaried missionary is apparent by the mere performance of the missionary work. The charitable
intent of a taxpayer providing transportation for the missionary, however, is less apparent. The taxpayer's intent may be to benefit the charity
or it may be to benefit the individual missionary. Similarly, whether a
taxpayer who contributes money to a full-time unsalaried missionary intends his contribution to benefit the church or the individual missionary
123. Id. at 1335.
124. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986).
125. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 932, 939 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir.
1986).
126. See, e.g., Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979) (deduction permitted where check was made payable to "Sara Barry Fund"); Peace v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 1, 2-3 (1964) (deduction allowed where checks made payable to "Sudan
Interior Mission" with the names of specified missionaries written on the lower lefthand corner of the face of the checks).
127. See, e.g., Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964) (contributions to
college were disallowed because the donor intended to aid a friend in securing an
education); Cook v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 774 (1978) (charitable
deduction not allowed for check made payable to the individual ministers because
there was no evidence that the money was ever under the direct control of the religious organization).
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is not apparent by the mere act of donating the money. When the donor's intent is not made obvious by the mere act, he must produce further evidence that he intends his contribution to benefit the charity.
The amount of control the charitable organization exercises over the
contributed funds and/or the activities of the person providing the charitable service is evidence of the intent of the contributor. Where the organization has absolute discretion as to the use of the funds or closely
supervises and directs the activity of the person providing the service, it
is likely that the donor or provider of services acted with charitable intent. Where the funds are earmarked for a specific individual or the activities of the volunteer lack any supervision or direction by the
charitable organization, the intent of the donor or provider of services is
less apparent.
Anything less than absolute control may not be sufficient to prove
donative intent and other factors which establish intent may need to be
examined. For example, in American Bar Endowment, A.B.E. was obligated to provide a requisite amount of insurance for the taxpayer from
his initial payment. 128 Thus, A.B.E. had no discretion as to the initial
use of the funds. The past performance of the insurance program indicated the high likelihood of a dividend at the end of the period covered
by the premium. 129 As a prerequisite to obtaining the insurance, the taxpayers relinquished all rights to the dividend. 130 Further, once the dividend was determined by the insurance company and paid to A.B.E.,
A.B.E. maintained complete control over and absolute discretion as to
the use of the funds. Even so, the requisite charitable intent was not
shown by the taxpayer and the deduction was not allowed. 131 Thus, control by the organization is not always determinative of the donor's intent.
Although the greater the benefit to the charity the more obvious the
charitable intent of the donor becomes and the greater the control the
charity maintains over the funds the more apparent the benefit to the
charity becomes, neither the "control test" nor the "primary beneficiary
test" is sufficient alone to determine whether a payment constitutes a
contribution or gift within the meaning of section 170. In Commissioner
v. Duberstein, \32 the Supreme Court declined to adopt a test urged by the
government to determine whether a transfer constituted a gift that was
excludable from income under section 102. \33 Rather, the Court found
that the proper criterion is one that inquires into the basic motivation
behind the donor's conduct and explains his actions in making the trans128. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107-08.
129. Id. at 108.
130.Id.
131. Id. at 118.
132. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
133. Id. at 287-89. The test recommended by the government defined gifts "as transfers
of property made for personal as distinguished from business reasons." Id. at 284
n.6.
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fer. 134 The Court stated, "The conclusion whether a transfer amounts to
a 'gift' is one that must be reached on consideration of all the factors."13s
Similarly, whether a payment constitutes a charitable contribution or gift
under section 170 should be determined by considering all the factors. 136
The taxpayer's knowledge that the service is being performed to
benefit the charity, and his knowledge that expenses are incurred as a
result of the service are critical factors to be shown. The organization's
control over the funds and the amount of benefit received by the organization are also important factors. Further, the relationship between the
donor and the organization, as well as the relationship between the donor
and any third party that may benefit from the donation, are also relevant
factors that should be considered by the court. Where the missionary is a
stranger to the taxpayer, it is likely that the taxpayer intended the payment to benefit the church rather than the individual missionary. If the
missionary is the taxpayer's son, however, the taxpayer's intent is not as
clear. Where the taxpayer and his family have been lifetime members of
a church and the taxpayer has encouraged his son to follow an established practice of the church by serving as a missionary, the taxpayer's
intent to benefit the church is supported by his relationship to the
church. On the other hand, if the parent has no relationship to the son's
church, it seems more likely that payments to the son would be intended
to benefit the son rather than the church.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In determining whether a taxpayer may deduct the payment of expenses resulting from services contributed by someone other than the
taxpayer, the following four-pronged modified American Bar Endowment
test should be satisfied: (1) the service performed benefits the charity;
(2) the performance of the service is intended to benefit the charity;
(3) the expense was incidental to the performance of the charitable service; and (4) the payment of the expense was made with the intention of
making a gift to the charity. In applying this test, the courts should consider all of the relevant factors. These factors include whether the taxpayer has knowledge that the service is being performed to benefit the
charity, whethet: the taxpayer has knowledge of the expenses incurred as
a result of the service, the amount of control the organization has over
the activity of the person providing the serVice, the amount of control the
organization has over the funds, the amount of benefit to the organization, the amount of benefit to the taxpayer or to the person providing the
service to the charity, the relationship between the taxpayer and the or134. Id. at 285-86.
135. Id. at 288.
136. For a discussion supporting application of the control test, see Shaller, Tax Exemption o/Charitable Organizations and the Deductibility o/Charitable Donations: Dangerous New Tests, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 77, 95-99 (1987).
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ganization, and the relationship between the taxpayer and the person
providing the service.

Jane Ruthetford Luckey

